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logic-ml subscribers様、<br>
<br>
下の案内で宛名を間違えまして大変失礼いたしました。<br>
ご興味をお持ちの方のご参加をお待ちいたしております。 岡田光弘<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2016/01/08 19:57, Mitsuhiro Okada
wrote:<br>
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<blockquote cite="mid:568F961D.3050600@abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp"
type="cite">
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<div class="moz-text-flowed" style="font-family: -moz-fixed;
font-size: 14px;" lang="x-unicode">基礎論学会様、<br>
<br>
貴学会の会員に興味をもたれる方が多くいらっしゃると思いますので、貴学会のメーリングリストで流していただけるとありがたいです。<br>
慶應義塾大学文学部 岡田光弘<br>
<br>
ーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーー<br>
論理と論証の哲学 (パリ第１大学哲学科、パリ科学史科学哲学研究所との共同 企画集会） <br>
French-Japanese Workshop on ｏｇｉｃ and Philosophy of Proofs <br>
<br>
パリ大学第1校哲学科（及びパリ科学史・科学哲学研究所）からの５名の訪問団 を迎え、論理および論証について議論する会を開催しま
す。 参加自由です。 (プログラムの最新版については，以下のURLをご覧ください) <a
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp/seminar/frjp16jan.html"><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp/seminar/frjp16jan.html">http://abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp/seminar/frjp16jan.html</a></a>
<br>
また、１５日午前中に同じ会場で非公式研究会を行います。 <br>
<br>
証明の表現、幾何学証明、証明の対象、証明の同一性、証明と論理的規範性など について議論します。、． <br>
ご興味がございましたら是非お立ち寄りください、 <br>
到着分のabstractsは下ににあります。最新情報については上記ＵＲＬをご覧く ださい。 <br>
<br>
--- <br>
Date: January 15th–16th, 2016 １月１５日ー１６日 <br>
<br>
Place: Distance Learning Room (B4F), South Building, Mita campus
of Keio University. TOKYO<br>
場所: 慶應大学三田キャンパス 南館地下4階 ディスタンスラーニングルーム (最寄駅:JR 田町、地下鉄三田又は赤羽橋) <br>
(<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://www.keio.ac.jp/en/maps/mita.html">http://www.keio.ac.jp/en/maps/mita.html</a>
13番の建物です。/ Building #13 on this map.) <br>
<br>
Speakers: and Discussants <br>
フランス側: <br>
Pierre Wagner (Professor, Université Paris 1, IHPST) <br>
Marco Panza (Professor, Université Paris 1, IHPST) <br>
Andrew Arana (Professor, Université Paris 1, IHPST) <br>
Alberto Naibo (Associate Professor, Université Paris 1, IHPST) <br>
Florencia Di Rocco (Ph.D candidate, Université Paris 1) <br>
and others Discussants <br>
<br>
日本側: <br>
Kengo Okamoto (Tokyo Metropolitan University) <br>
Koji Mineshima (Ochanomizu University) <br>
Mitsuhiro Okada ( Keio University) <br>
Yutaro Sugimoto (Keio University) <br>
Yuta Takahashi (Keio University) <br>
Yuki Nishimuta (Keio University) <br>
<br>
<br>
Program (tentative): <br>
<br>
<br>
Friday, January 15th <br>
(Morning Closed discussion meeting) <br>
<br>
14:00 Session I <br>
Yuta Takahashi“Philosophy of Gentzen's proof theory'' <br>
Koji Mineshima“Combining a type-logical semantics and a
wide-coverage statistical parser” <br>
Florencia Di Rocco “Logic and Mathematics of Japanese
Counters'' <br>
Discussion <br>
17:00 Close <br>
<br>
<br>
Saturday, January 16th <br>
<br>
10:30 Session II <br>
Kengo Okamoto “TBA” <br>
Pierre Wagner & Mitsuhiro Okada “TBA” <br>
Discussion <br>
12:30 Lunch Break <br>
14:00 Session III <br>
Marco Panza “The twofold role of diagrams in Euclid's geometry”
<br>
Alberto Naibo “Representing inferences and proofs: the case of
harmony and conservativity” <br>
Andrew Arana “Complexity of proof and purity of methods” <br>
Discussion <br>
17:00 <br>
Close <br>
<br>
--- <br>
<br>
Abstracts: <br>
<br>
Koji Mineshima “Combining a type-logical semantics and a
wide-coverage statistical parser” <br>
We present a type-logical semantics for wide-coverage
statistical parsers based on Combinatorial Categorical Grammar
(CCG) developed for English and Japanese. The system we have
been developing enables to map open-domain texts into formulas
in higher-order logic that capture a variety of semantic
information such as quantification and intensionality. We also
discuss how a robust model of lexical knowledge can be
integrated into our type-theoretical framework. (Joint work with
Pascual Martinez-Gomez, Yusuke Miyao and Daisuke Bekki) <br>
<br>
Andrew Arana “Complexity of proof and purity of methods” <br>
Roughly, a proof of a theorem, is “pure” if it draws only on
what is “close” or “intrinsic” to that theorem. Mathematicians
employ a variety of terms to identify pure proofs, saying that a
pure proof is one that avoids what is “extrinsic”, “extraneous”,
“distant”, “remote”, “alien”, or “foreign” to the problem or
theorem under investigation. In the background of these
attributions is the view that there is a distance measure (or a
variety of such measures) between mathematical statements and
proofs. Mathematicians have paid little attention to specifying
such distance measures precisely because in practice certain
methods of proof have seemed self-evidently impure by design:
think for instance of analytic geometry and analytic number
theory. By contrast mathematicians have paid considerable
attention to whether such impurities are a good thing or to be
avoided, and some have claimed that they are valuable because
generally impure proofs are simpler than pure proofs. This talk
is an investigation of this claim, formulated more precisely by
proof-theoretic means. Our thesis is that evidence from proof
theory does not support this claim. <br>
<br>
Marco Panza “The twofold role of diagrams in Euclid's geometry”
<br>
Proposition I.1 of the Elements is, by far, the most popular
example used to justify the thesis that many of Euclid's
geometric arguments are diagram-based. Many scholars have
articulated this thesis in different ways and argued for it. I
suggest to reformulate it in a quite general way, by describing
what I take to be the twofold role that diagrams play in
Euclid's plane geometry (EPG). Euclid's arguments are object
dependent. They are about geometric objects. Hence, they cannot
be diagram-based unless diagrams are supposed to have an
appropriate relation with these objects. I take this relation to
be a quite peculiar sort of representation. Its peculiarity
depends on the two following claims that I shall argue for: (i)
The identity conditions of EPG objects are provided by the
identity conditions of the diagrams that represent them; (ii)
EPG objects inherit some properties and relations from these
diagrams. <br>
<br>
Alberto Naibo “Representing inferences and proofs: the case of
harmony and conservativity” <br>
Traditionally, proof-theoretic semantics focuses on the study of
logical theories from a general point of view, rather than on
specific mathematical theories. Yet, when mathematical theories
are analyzed, they seem to behave quite differently from purely
logical theories. A well-known example has been given by Prawitz
(1994): adding of a set of inferentially harmonious rules to
arithmetic does not always guarantee to obtain a theory which is
a conservative extension of arithmetic itself. This means that
outside logic the nice correspondence between harmony and
conservativity (advocated for example by Dummett (1991)) seems
to be broken. However, as it has been pointed out by Sundholm
(1998), this is not necessarily a consequence due to the passage
from a logical setting to a mathematical one. It could depend
also on the way in which proofs are represented. In particular,
if proofs are seen as composed by rules which act on judgments
involving proof-objects, rather than on rules which a <br>
ct on propositions, then the aforementioned correspondence can
be in fact be reestablished. An analysis of this phenomenon is
proposed. In particular, two different ways of representing
proof-objects are taken into consideration: the Church-style
presentation and the Curry-style presentation. It is then shown
that a crucial difference can be obtained by choosing the first
rather than the second. <br>
Bibliographical references: Dummett, M. (1991). The Logical
Basis of Metaphysics. London: Duckworth. <br>
Prawitz, D. (1994). Review of 'The Logical Basis of Metaphysics'
by Michael Dummett. Mind, NS, 103 (411): 373–376. Sundholm, G.
(1998). Proofs as acts and proofs as objects: Some questions for
Dag Prawitz. Theoria, 64 (2-3): 187–216. <br>
<br>
Florencia Di Rocco “Logic and Mathematics of Japanese Counters''
<br>
Either a feature of a “conceptual scheme'' -Quine- or a
triviality of “syntax'' -Peyraube, Thekla-, the function of
counters is traditionally think as that of getting
“individuals'' out from the noun they apply to. I will challenge
this classical approach by a contextualist position in
philosophy of language. Extending linguistics -Hashimoto, Chao-
from Chinese to Japanese, I will present counters as operators
enlightening contextual relevant features. Through every-day
examples in Japanese, we will show how counters work as Austin's
“adjuster words'', their “logic'' being ascribed to the dynamics
of “language games'' -Wittgenstein- or “rules of adjustment of
salience'' in a “well-run conversation'' -David Lewis-. This
position will progressively lead to the idea that counting
operations do not necessarily deal with “individuals''. We will
thus raise up a certain number of problems related to philosophy
of mathematics, logic and pragmatics concerned in the use of Jap
<br>
anese counters -such as the link between unities and
individuals, counting and measuring, and between numbers,
counters and ordinary concepts- and sketch a wittgensteinian
type of answer. By showing their contextual plasticity, I will
challenge the mere idea of the existence of rigid “counter
words''. <br>
<br>
お問い合わせ先: 慶應義塾大学文学部岡田研究室内 三田ロジックセミナー 講演 会事務局 <br>
E-mail：logic [AT] abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp <br>
<br>
主催：慶應義塾大学 論理と感性のグローバルリサーチセンター <br>
共催：慶應義塾大学次世代研究プロジェクト 論理思考の次世代型研究と論理的 思考力発達支援への応用研究 <br>
<br>
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