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<div class="moz-text-flowed" style="font-family: -moz-fixed;
font-size: 14px;" lang="x-unicode">基礎論学会様、<br>
<br>
貴学会の会員に興味をもたれる方が多くいらっしゃると思いますので、貴学会のメーリングリストで流していただけるとありがたいです。<br>
慶應義塾大学文学部 岡田光弘<br>
<br>
ーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーー<br>
論理と論証の哲学 (パリ第１大学哲学科、パリ科学史科学哲学研究所との共同 企画集会）
<br>
French-Japanese Workshop on ｏｇｉｃ and Philosophy of Proofs
<br>
<br>
パリ大学第1校哲学科（及びパリ科学史・科学哲学研究所）からの５名の訪問団 を迎え、論理および論証について議論する会を開催しま
す。 参加自由です。 (プログラムの最新版については，以下のURLをご覧ください) <a
class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp/seminar/frjp16jan.html"><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp/seminar/frjp16jan.html">http://abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp/seminar/frjp16jan.html</a></a>
<br>
また、１５日午前中に同じ会場で非公式研究会を行います。
<br>
<br>
証明の表現、幾何学証明、証明の対象、証明の同一性、証明と論理的規範性など について議論します。、．
<br>
ご興味がございましたら是非お立ち寄りください、
<br>
到着分のabstractsは下ににあります。最新情報については上記ＵＲＬをご覧く ださい。
<br>
<br>
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Date: January 15th–16th, 2016 １月１５日ー１６日
<br>
<br>
Place: Distance Learning Room (B4F), South Building, Mita campus
of Keio University.
TOKYO<br>
場所: 慶應大学三田キャンパス 南館地下4階 ディスタンスラーニングルーム (最寄駅:JR 田町、地下鉄三田又は赤羽橋)
<br>
(<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://www.keio.ac.jp/en/maps/mita.html">http://www.keio.ac.jp/en/maps/mita.html</a>
13番の建物です。/ Building #13 on this map.)
<br>
<br>
Speakers: and Discussants
<br>
フランス側:
<br>
Pierre Wagner (Professor, Université Paris 1, IHPST)
<br>
Marco Panza (Professor, Université Paris 1, IHPST)
<br>
Andrew Arana (Professor, Université Paris 1, IHPST)
<br>
Alberto Naibo (Associate Professor, Université Paris 1, IHPST)
<br>
Florencia Di Rocco (Ph.D candidate, Université Paris 1)
<br>
and others Discussants
<br>
<br>
日本側:
<br>
Kengo Okamoto (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
<br>
Koji Mineshima (Ochanomizu University)
<br>
Mitsuhiro Okada ( Keio University)
<br>
Yutaro Sugimoto (Keio University)
<br>
Yuta Takahashi (Keio University)
<br>
Yuki Nishimuta (Keio University)
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<br>
<br>
Program (tentative):
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<br>
<br>
Friday, January 15th
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(Morning Closed discussion meeting)
<br>
<br>
14:00 Session I
<br>
Yuta Takahashi“Philosophy of Gentzen's proof theory''
<br>
Koji Mineshima“Combining a type-logical semantics and a
wide-coverage statistical parser”
<br>
Florencia Di Rocco “Logic and Mathematics of Japanese Counters''
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Discussion
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17:00 Close
<br>
<br>
<br>
Saturday, January 16th
<br>
<br>
10:30 Session II
<br>
Kengo Okamoto “TBA”
<br>
Pierre Wagner & Mitsuhiro Okada “TBA”
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Discussion
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12:30 Lunch Break
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14:00 Session III
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Marco Panza “The twofold role of diagrams in Euclid's geometry”
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Alberto Naibo “Representing inferences and proofs: the case of
harmony and conservativity”
<br>
Andrew Arana “Complexity of proof and purity of methods”
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Discussion
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17:00
<br>
Close
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---
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<br>
Abstracts:
<br>
<br>
Koji Mineshima “Combining a type-logical semantics and a
wide-coverage statistical parser”
<br>
We present a type-logical semantics for wide-coverage statistical
parsers based on Combinatorial Categorical Grammar (CCG) developed
for English and Japanese. The system we have been developing
enables to map open-domain texts into formulas in higher-order
logic that capture a variety of semantic information such as
quantification and intensionality. We also discuss how a robust
model of lexical knowledge can be integrated into our
type-theoretical framework. (Joint work with Pascual
Martinez-Gomez, Yusuke Miyao and Daisuke Bekki)
<br>
<br>
Andrew Arana “Complexity of proof and purity of methods”
<br>
Roughly, a proof of a theorem, is “pure” if it draws only on what
is “close” or “intrinsic” to that theorem. Mathematicians employ a
variety of terms to identify pure proofs, saying that a pure proof
is one that avoids what is “extrinsic”, “extraneous”, “distant”,
“remote”, “alien”, or “foreign” to the problem or theorem under
investigation. In the background of these attributions is the view
that there is a distance measure (or a variety of such measures)
between mathematical statements and proofs. Mathematicians have
paid little attention to specifying such distance measures
precisely because in practice certain methods of proof have seemed
self-evidently impure by design: think for instance of analytic
geometry and analytic number theory. By contrast mathematicians
have paid considerable attention to whether such impurities are a
good thing or to be avoided, and some have claimed that they are
valuable because generally impure proofs are simpler than pure
proofs. This talk is an investigation of this claim, formulated
more precisely by proof-theoretic means. Our thesis is that
evidence from proof theory does not support this claim.
<br>
<br>
Marco Panza “The twofold role of diagrams in Euclid's geometry”
<br>
Proposition I.1 of the Elements is, by far, the most popular
example used to justify the thesis that many of Euclid's geometric
arguments are diagram-based. Many scholars have articulated this
thesis in different ways and argued for it. I suggest to
reformulate it in a quite general way, by describing what I take
to be the twofold role that diagrams play in Euclid's plane
geometry (EPG). Euclid's arguments are object dependent. They are
about geometric objects. Hence, they cannot be diagram-based
unless diagrams are supposed to have an appropriate relation with
these objects. I take this relation to be a quite peculiar sort of
representation. Its peculiarity depends on the two following
claims that I shall argue for: (i) The identity conditions of EPG
objects are provided by the identity conditions of the diagrams
that represent them; (ii) EPG objects inherit some properties and
relations from these diagrams.
<br>
<br>
Alberto Naibo “Representing inferences and proofs: the case of
harmony and conservativity”
<br>
Traditionally, proof-theoretic semantics focuses on the study of
logical theories from a general point of view, rather than on
specific mathematical theories. Yet, when mathematical theories
are analyzed, they seem to behave quite differently from purely
logical theories. A well-known example has been given by Prawitz
(1994): adding of a set of inferentially harmonious rules to
arithmetic does not always guarantee to obtain a theory which is a
conservative extension of arithmetic itself. This means that
outside logic the nice correspondence between harmony and
conservativity (advocated for example by Dummett (1991)) seems to
be broken. However, as it has been pointed out by Sundholm (1998),
this is not necessarily a consequence due to the passage from a
logical setting to a mathematical one. It could depend also on the
way in which proofs are represented. In particular, if proofs are
seen as composed by rules which act on judgments involving
proof-objects, rather than on rules which a
<br>
ct on propositions, then the aforementioned correspondence can be
in fact be reestablished. An analysis of this phenomenon is
proposed. In particular, two different ways of representing
proof-objects are taken into consideration: the Church-style
presentation and the Curry-style presentation. It is then shown
that a crucial difference can be obtained by choosing the first
rather than the second.
<br>
Bibliographical references: Dummett, M. (1991). The Logical Basis
of Metaphysics. London: Duckworth.
<br>
Prawitz, D. (1994). Review of 'The Logical Basis of Metaphysics'
by Michael Dummett. Mind, NS, 103 (411): 373–376. Sundholm, G.
(1998). Proofs as acts and proofs as objects: Some questions for
Dag Prawitz. Theoria, 64 (2-3): 187–216.
<br>
<br>
Florencia Di Rocco “Logic and Mathematics of Japanese Counters''
<br>
Either a feature of a “conceptual scheme'' -Quine- or a triviality
of “syntax'' -Peyraube, Thekla-, the function of counters is
traditionally think as that of getting “individuals'' out from the
noun they apply to. I will challenge this classical approach by a
contextualist position in philosophy of language. Extending
linguistics -Hashimoto, Chao- from Chinese to Japanese, I will
present counters as operators enlightening contextual relevant
features. Through every-day examples in Japanese, we will show how
counters work as Austin's “adjuster words'', their “logic'' being
ascribed to the dynamics of “language games'' -Wittgenstein- or
“rules of adjustment of salience'' in a “well-run conversation''
-David Lewis-. This position will progressively lead to the idea
that counting operations do not necessarily deal with
“individuals''. We will thus raise up a certain number of problems
related to philosophy of mathematics, logic and pragmatics
concerned in the use of Jap
<br>
anese counters -such as the link between unities and individuals,
counting and measuring, and between numbers, counters and ordinary
concepts- and sketch a wittgensteinian type of answer. By showing
their contextual plasticity, I will challenge the mere idea of the
existence of rigid “counter words''.
<br>
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お問い合わせ先: 慶應義塾大学文学部岡田研究室内 三田ロジックセミナー 講演 会事務局
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E-mail：logic [AT] abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp
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主催：慶應義塾大学 論理と感性のグローバルリサーチセンター
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共催：慶應義塾大学次世代研究プロジェクト 論理思考の次世代型研究と論理的 思考力発達支援への応用研究
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